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Abstract. This paper derives the implications for migrants’ self selection in unobservables that 
arise from the introduction of uncertainty in the decision problem that would be migrants face. 
We show that if one lifts the assumption introduced in Borjas (1987) that foreign wages are 
known before the migration decision is taken, then the case for the so called refugee sorting 
narrows down considerably, while negative selection becomes a more likely outcome. A greater 
dispersion of income at destination no longer suffices to predict that immigrants will obtain a 
higher average income than natives. 
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The paper by Borjas (1987), which is based on Roy (1951), represents a seminal contribution 
in the literature on migrants’ self selection, and on their performance on the labor market at 
destination. Borjas (1987) identifies the relative dispersion of the earnings distributions in the 
sending  and  the  receiving  countries,  and  the  correlation  between  the  two,  as  the  leading 
factors that shape the pattern of migrants’ self selection. A number of theoretical and empirical 
contributions has been produced to refine or test his theoretical predictions (e.g. Jasso and 
Rosenzweig, 1990; Borjas, 1995; Chiswick, 1999; Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005; McKenzie and 
Rapoport, forthcoming, Fernández Huertas Moraga, forthcoming).  
Interestingly,  while  Borjas  (1987)  assumes  that  domestic  and  foreign  wages  include  a 
stochastic term, some of the most recent theoretical contributions in the literature, such as 
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) and McKenzie and Rapoport (forthcoming), propose models where 
wages  are  described  by  deterministic  functions.
2  Still,  the  difference  between  the  two 
approaches is narrower than it appears, as the model by Borjas (1987) rules out uncertainty 
from the decision to migrate: an agent decides whether to migrate after he has observed the 
realizations  of  the  stochastic  component  of  both  domestic  and  foreign  wages.  This 
informational structure portraits migration as a risk free decision, and it entails that agents 
behave as if they were income maximizers.  
This paper assesses the consequences of a slight modification in the informational structure of 
the decision problem that would be migrants face, adopting the analytical framework originally 
proposed by Borjas (1987). Specifically, we introduce uncertainty in the migration decision, 
assuming that an agent decides whether to migrate after he has observed the realization of 
the  domestic  wage,  but  not  that  of  the  foreign  one.  This  assumption  reflects  the  idea  that 
would be migrants have a better knowledge of their domestic wage, though we maintain that 
the  distributions  of  the  two  stochastic  components  are  known  to  the  economic  agents.  We 
show that the sets of model parameters that support the occurrence of the so called refugee 
sorting  and  of  negative  migrants’  self selection  change  substantially,  and  that  a  greater 
dispersion of incomes at destination no longer suffices to predict that migrants will outperform 
natives in terms of income. 
We  first  replicate  the  analysis  in  Borjas  (1987),  and  then  analyze  the  model  under  the 






                                            
2  Chiquiar  and  Hanson  (2005)  argue  that  “implicitly,  we  imagine  that  there  are  random  components  to  wage 
determination, but for simplicity we leave such features in the background” (p. 242). 3 
The self-selection model 
 
Let the subscript 0 denote the country of origin, and the subscript 1 denote the country of 
destination of the migrants. Domestic and foreign wages for the countries follow a log normal 
distribution: 
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The parameters m0 and m1 capture the influence of observable factors upon wages in the two 
countries,  while  the  stochastic  variables  e0  and  e1  describe  the  influence  of  unobserved 
characteristics upon wages. The correlation between the two distributions is represented by r, 
while the parameter p>0 describes time equivalent migration costs. 
 
Migration with no uncertainty 
 
Borjas (1987) assumes that an agent decides whether to migrate after he has observed his 
realizations of the stochastic variables e0 and e1, so that he can compare his actual wage in 
country 0 with what he would earn in country 1. The decision to migrate can be characterized 
by the sign of the index function I: 
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e e = m - m - p + e - e ;           [3] 
 
with migration occurring if I>0. Although Borjas (1987) portraits his model as describing the 
implications  for  migrants’  self selection  that  arise  when  “potential  migrants  are  income 
maximizers”, this is an unnecessary restriction to the scope of his model: the informational 
structure that underlies Eq. [3] leaves no role for uncertainty, so that agents behave as if they 
were income maximizers, independently of the possible introduction of a utility function which 
is non linear in income. An agent would always simply maximize the argument of his utility 
function, as the decision to migrate boils down to the choice of the country which offers the 
highest  wage.  Observe  that  Eq.  [3]  is  monotonically  decreasing  in  e0,  so  that  poorer 
realizations of the domestic stochastic component increase the probability that an agent will 
migrate. 
The interest of the model resides in understanding how the average wage of the individuals 
who  self select  themselves  into  migration  relates  to  the  average  wage  in  both  origin  and 
destination countries. The two wage differentials can be defined as Q0 and Q1, and   following 
Heckman (1979)   Borjas (1987) shows that: 4 
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F(z)  denoting  the  probability  and  the  cumulative  density  function  of  the  standard  normal 
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where k= s1/s0. The combination of Eqs. [6] [7] reveals that there are three possible scenarios 
with respect to migrants’ self selection in unobservables: positive selection, where migrants 
earn  above  average  wages  in  both  countries  (Q0>0  and  Q1>0);  negative  selection,  where 
migrants are drawn from the left tail of the income distribution, and underperform the natives 
at destination (Q0<0 and Q1<0);
3 refugee sorting, where migrants are drawn from the left tail 
of the income distribution, but outperform natives at destination (Q0<0 and Q1>0). Figure 1 
depicts the regions in the parameter space that correspond to the three scenarios. 
 
Figure 1. Patterns of self selection in unobservables with migration with no uncertainty 
 
 
                                            
3 Borjas (1987) first oberves that m1 denotes “the mean income that residents from the home country would eam in 
the United States if all home country citizens were to migrate to the United States” (p. 532, emphasis in the original), 
but then it discusses the testable implications of his model as if m1 denoted also the average income of natives; he 
writes that refugee sorting denotes a situation where “the United States draws below average immigrants (in terms of 
the country of origin), but they outperform the U.S. native born upon arrival” (p. 534, emphasis added). 5 
 
Observe, from Eq. [7], that whenever wages are more dispersed at destination than at origin, 
then  migrants  outperform  the  natives  at  destination.  Moreover,  Borjas  (1987)  predicts  that 
migrants are drawn from the left hand tail of the income distribution at origin but end up in 
the  right hand  tail  of  the  distribution  at  destination,  i.e.  refugee  sorting  occurs,  when  the 
distributions of e0 and e1 are independent.  
From Eqs. [4] [5], we can compute the average income of natives in country 0, w, accounting 
for their self selection across destinations; we have that: 
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Migration under uncertainty 
 
We now analyze the implications for migrants’ self selection of model described in Eqs. [1] [2] 
under  an  alternative  informational  structure:  we  assume  that  an  agent  decides  whether  to 
migrate after he has observed the realization of e0, but not the realization of e1. For analytical 
convenience, we assume that agents are risk neutral, as this limiting case suffices to show the 
implications of a reduction in the size of the information set on which would be migrants take 
their  decisions.  This  information  set  contains  the realization  of  e0  and  the  expectation  of e1 
conditional on e0. Under the bivariate normality assumption, we have that: 
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Migration can be characterized by the index function I’: 
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The  parameters  r  and  k  that  characterize  the  bivariate  normal  distribution  influence  the 
decision to migrate, while they do not when migration entails no uncertainty.
4 Furthermore, we 
can observe that: 
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4 Note that Eq. [10] is invariant in e0 when r=1/k, so that either no one migrates if m1≤ m 0+p , or every one migrates; 
in this latter case, then average wage of the migrants at destination trivially coincides with that of the natives; this 
limiting case will be omitted from the discussion in the paper.  6 
Differently from Borjas (1987), Eq. [11] reveals better realizations of the domestic stochastic 
component  of  the  wage  can  increase  the  probability  of  migration,  as  the  realization  of  e0 
conveys information on e1 whenever the two distributions are not uncorrelated. If wages are 
more  dispersed  at  destination  than  at  origin,  and  the  two  distributions  are  positively  and 
tightly  correlated,  then  the  signal  about  e1  that  an  agent  obtains  when  observing  a  poor 
realization of e0 can more than offset the incentive to migrate that the observed realization 
creates.  
We can asses the pattern of migrants’ self selection under the informational structure reflected 
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6 Eqs. [12] [13] reveal that the migrants can obtain starkly 
different  wage  outcomes  in  the  origin  and  in  the  destination  countries  only  when  the 
correlation  coeffiecient  r  is  negative,  while  Borjas  (1987)  predicted  the  occurrence  of  the 
so called refugee sorting even when  0. r ³  This can no longer happen when migration occurs 
before  the  realization  of  e1  is  observed.  A  nonnegative  correlation  between  the  two 
distributions  entails  that  migrants’  wages  are  drawn  from  the  same  tail  of  the  income 
distribution  both  at  origin  and  at  destination.  Intuitively,  the  contraction  in  the  size  of  the 
information  set  that  we  have  introduced  reduces  migrants’  ability  to  improve  their  relative 
income status when moving. Moreover, Eqs. [12] [13] entail that a greater income dispersion 
at  destination,  i.e.  k>1,  no  longer  ensures  that  immigrants  will  outperform  natives  upon 
arrival, while Borjas argued that “in essence, the model says that prices matter: whether the 
immigrant  flow  is  positively  or  negatively  selected  depends  on  the  relative  rewards  to 










                                            
5 Eq. [12] uses the fact that E(x|x<y)= l(y)[F( y)/F(y)]<0, as l(y)=E(x|x≥y), where x is the standard normal. 
6 Observe that the variance of w is always smaller than the variance of u. 7 
Figure 2. Patterns of self selection in unobservables with migration under uncertainty 
 
 
The  implications  of  the  proposed  change  in  the  informational  structure  of  the  migration 
decision are not limited to the reshaping of the parameter regions that correspond to the three 
possible patterns of self selection, that can be observed from a comparison of Figure 1 and 2. 
As we did under the informational structure assumed in Borjas (1987), we can compute the 
average  income  of  natives  in  country  0,  w’,  under  the  alternative  informational  structure; 
specifically, we have that: 
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The comparison of Eqs. [8] and [14] reveals that the exclusion of the realization of e1 from 
would be  migrants’  information  set  reduces  the  average  income  of  natives  in  country  0 
compared to the information structure assumed by Borjas (1987). Specifically, we have that: 
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which is always positive, as su>sw entails that: 
 8 
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From  Eq.  [15],  we  can  observe  that  when  m1= m0+p,  i.e.  z=0,  the  income  loss  due  to  the 
contraction of the information set is proportional to the standard deviation the distribution of e1 
conditional upon the realization of e0: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 2
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Eq. [17] shows that the income loss is higher the lower the information about e1 that can be 




The  informational  structure  that  underlies  the  most  theoretical  representations  of  migration 
decision problems assumes – either explicitly or implicitly   a perfect knowledge of the foreign 
wages  before  migration  occurs.  We  have  shown  that  the  introduction  of  an  alternative 
informational  framework,  where  only  domestic  wages  are  known,  influences  the  theoretical 
predictions with respect to migrants’ self selection in unobservables. Adopting the framework 
proposed by Borjas (1987), the case for the so called refugee sorting narrows down, while the 
case  for  migrants’  negative  self selection  symmetrically  expands.  Moreover,  a  destination 
country might fail to attract “the best and the brightest” even when its income distribution is 
more dispersed than the one prevailing in the country of origin of the migrants. These findings 
warn  against  the  possible  consequences  of  reducing  the  role  that  uncertainty  plays  in  the 
decision to migrate. They also point to the additional insights that could be gained through the 
analysis  of  a  further  reduction  in  the  size  of  the  information  set,  assuming  that  would be 
migrants do not know the objective distribution of incomes at destination, or from considering 
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